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COMMENTS 
GONE WITH THE WIND:  WHY EVEN 
UTILITY PATENTS CANNOT FENCE IN 
SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES 
JESSICA LYND∗ 
Genetically modified (GM) seeds are a self-replicating patented technology, 
which through pollen drift can contaminate neighboring crops, leaving the 
contaminated farmer liable for patent infringement.  When pollen drift occurs, 
the patent holder should not be entitled to enforcement rights.  This is because 
the self-replicating patented organism has itself caused the infringement and 
has simultaneously failed the moral utility test. Furthermore, patent 
enforcement should be void under the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritor 
actio when infringement arises from unlawful trespass or nuisance caused by 
the patented organism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Monsanto1 first introduced genetically modified2 (GM) seeds 
in India in 1998, more than 100,000 Indian farmers have committed 
suicide.3  During the peak of the tragedy, which has been labeled by 
some as the “GM Genocide,” an average of forty-six farmers 
committed suicide each day, usually by drinking toxic pesticides.4  As 
                                                          
 1. Monsanto Co. is a plant biotechnology and chemical company based in St. Louis, 
Missouri that sells transgenic, also known as GM, seeds and herbicide products, including 
Roundup Ready seed and Roundup herbicide, as well as Bt Cotton.  Monsanto Corporate 
Brochure, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Documents/Monsanto 
_Corporate_Brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 2. See Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits:  An Overview of Issues in 
Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 269 (2001) (defining 
genetically modified seeds as having been inserted with “strands of foreign genetic 
material in an effort to change or supplement one or more of the plant’s traits” 
(emphasis added)). “Genetically modified” and “genetically engineered” are generally 
interchangeable. See Glossary, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/ 
Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (using the same definition for both 
terms). 
 3. See Priya Kumar, Biopiracy, GM Seeds and Rural India, GLOBAL RES. (June 2, 
2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/biopiracy-gm-seeds-and-rural-india (tallying 
over 100,000 Indian farmer suicides between 1997 and 2009 and attributing the 
suicide “epidemic” to debt and depression caused by the failures of GM seeds); P. 
Sainath, The Largest Wave of Suicides in History, ZNET (Feb. 13, 2009), 
www.zcommunications.org/the-largest-wave-of-suicides-in-history-by-p-sainath 
(associating the WTO programs with suicide rates where one farmer took his life 
every 30 minutes); Somini Sengupta, On India’s Farms, A Plague of Suicide, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/world/asia/19india.html 
(citing government reports of 17,000 Indian farmer suicides in 2003 alone). 
 4. NCRB Claims 46 Farmers Commit Suicide Every Day in India, INFOCHANGE, 
http://infochangeindia.org/agriculture/news/ncrb-claims-46-farmers-commit-suicide-
every-day-in-india.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (citing the National Crime Records 
Bureau of India for the year 2007).  At the same time India liberalized its cotton trade, 
the government heavily promoted GM seeds at the urging of international lending 
institutions, including the Inter Monetary Fund and World Bank, and as required by 
government agreements with Monsanto to obtain the seeds.  See Vandana Shiva, The 
Suicide Economy of Corporate Globalisation, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Apr. 5, 2004), 
http://www.countercurrents.org/glo-shiva050404.htm (“In 1998, the World Bank’s 
structural adjustment policies forced India to open up its seed sector to global 
corporations like . . . Monsanto . . . .  The global corporations changed the input 
economy overnight.”); see also Iqbal Ahmed, Killer Seeds:  The Devastating Impacts of 
Monsanto’s Genetically Modified Seeds in India, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Jan. 12, 2012), 
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conventional seeds became increasingly difficult to find, small 
farmers took out loans to purchase the GM seeds; despite claims of 
increased production, the seeds required double the water of 
conventional seeds, and some reports suggested the seeds were highly 
susceptible to bollworm parasites.5  Many farmers lost their entire 
crop and had no way of paying off their large debts.6 
Exacerbating the farmers' debts, however, is that Monsanto's GM 
seeds are licensed on the condition that the seeds will not be saved 
for replanting,7 requiring the farmers to purchase new costly seeds 
each year and placing the farmers further in debt.  The stress and 
shame resulted in the GM Genocide, an epidemic tragedy.8  Like in 
India, GM seed patents in the US permit license agreements that 
prohibit seed saving and allow causes of action for both the breach of 
the license agreement, and the infringement of the patent, even 
when breach or infringement occurred because of pollen drift.9 
                                                          
http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=28629 (stating that agreements 
between Monsanto and the Indian state governments dictated the terms of disseminating 
the GM technology); Vandana Shiva, Monsanto’s Seed MOU with Rajasthan Agricultural 
Universities Cancelled, NAVDANYA, http://www.navdanya.org/news/214-monsantos-seed-
mou-with-rajasthan-agricultural-universities-cancelled (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) 
(reporting that Indian universities cancelled similar agreements with Monsanto in 2011).  
The government also encouraged the local banks to provide liberal financing for the 
seeds that cost at least two times the price of conventional seeds in India.  See Ahmed, 
supra (explaining that the unavailability of traditional seeds coupled with the ten-fold 
price increase for GM seeds caused many farmers to take out loans to finance their seed 
purchase); Andrew Malone, The GM Genocide:  Thousands of Indian Farmers are Committing 
Suicide After Using Genetically Modified Crops, MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2008), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1082559/The-GM-genocide-Thousands-Indian-
farmers-committing-suicide-using-genetically-modified-crops.html (stating that most 
farmers who commit suicide do so by swallowing insecticide). 
 5. See Malone, supra note 4 (refuting the promises of GM salesmen who claimed 
to be selling “magic seeds”); see also Mae-Wan Ho, Farmer Suicides and Bt Cotton 
Nightmare Unfolding in India, INST. OF SCI. IN SOC’Y (June 1, 2010), http://www.i-
sis.org.uk/farmersSuicidesBtCottonIndia.php (contradicting Monsanto’s claims that 
their Bt cotton GM seeds cause a decrease in bollworms). 
 6. See George Lerner, Activist:  Farmer Suicides in India Linked to Debt, Globalization, 
CNN WORLD (Jan. 5, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-05/world/india.farmer. 
suicides_1_farmer-suicides-andhra-pradesh-vandana-shiva (quoting an environmental 
activist who connected farmer suicides to corporate seed control, leading to increased 
production costs for already-struggling farmers and falling food prices in a global 
agricultural economy). 
 7. See 2008 MONSANTO TECHNOLOGY/STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT, MONSANTO, 
available at http://www.monsanto.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/tug_sample.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter MTSA] (including a clausal agreement to not 
save seeds). 
 8. See Sanjay Jha, Food Technology Driving Indian Farmers Toward Suicide, 
NOWPUBLIC (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.nowpublic.com/environment/food-
technology-driving-indian-farmers-towards-suicide (reporting that Prince Charles 
believed that Indian suicides are due to GM seed use). 
 9. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(permitting patent holder rights to extend to second generation seed), No. 11-796 
(U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013); MTSA, supra note 7 (prohibiting seed saving). 
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Pollen drift can occur when cross-pollinating plants from GM seeds 
naturally release pollen that can contaminate nearby conventional 
crops growing on another farmer’s land—a farmer who is not paying 
a licensing fee to the patent holder for the GM crop.10  Monsanto 
filed over 144 lawsuits between 1997 and 2010 for alleged patent 
infringement or breach of license for its seeds.11  And at least 700 
matters have been settled out of court.12  The company has 
investigated a much greater number through its heavily funded 
investigation team and in conjunction with contracted private 
investigator services.13 
Patent infringement is a strict liability offense, and, as such, intent 
or fault on the part of the alleged infringer is irrelevant.14  In 
addition, courts have not found it relevant to infringement that the 
GM contamination actually causes financial and legal harm to the 
alleged infringer by contaminating his or her conventional crop and 
trespassing onto his or her land.15 
                                                          
 10. See Kolehmainen, supra note 2, at 280 (describing pollen drift and explaining 
that “genetically modified plants produce pollen that may also contain the foreign 
genetic material” and that the “pollen can be picked up by insects, birds, wind, or 
rain and carried into neighboring fields”).  If a neighboring field is producing 
organic crops, it may be unable to sell its product, which “happened to organic corn 
chip maker Terra Prima, who lost $87,000 when its European exports tested positive 
for GM ingredients.”  Id.; see also Amelia P. Nelson, Note, Legal Liability in the Wake of 
StarLinkTM:  Who Pays in the End?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 241, 251–52 (2002) (describing 
pollen drift as the “intermixing of pollen by air or animal during the time of 
pollination”). 
 11. See First Amended Complaint at 1–2, 46–47, Organic Seed Growers & Trade 
Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 2163-NRB), 
available at http://www.osgata.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/OSGATA-Amended-
Complaint.pdf (seeking a declaratory judgment to prevent Monsanto’s use of its 
aggressive patent-enforcement tactics against farmers who never intended to use 
transgenic seeds). 
 12. See E. Freeman, Settling the Matter—Part 5, MONSANTO (Nov. 11, 2008), 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Settling-the-Matter-Part-5.aspx (citing 
a Monsanto employee who stated that most farmers are willing to settle infringement 
claims before trial because it is more economical than fighting the allegations). 
 13. Compare E. Freeman, Seed Police?  Part 4, MONSANTO (Nov. 10, 2008), 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Seed-Police-Part-4.aspx (explaining a 
friendly process for investigating farmers for infringement or breach), with CTR. FOR FOOD 
SAFETY, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS 24–28 (2005) [hereinafter CFS REPORT], available at 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/CFSMOnsantovsFarmerReport1.13.05.pdf 
(describing the experiences of several farmers who report they were verbally harassed and 
intentionally intimidated). 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (omitting intent or fault as elements of patent 
infringement); see also Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent 
Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1590 (2011) (describing the strict liability nature 
of patent infringement). 
 15. See, e.g., Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 
2d 544, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), No. 12-1298 (Fed. Cir. argued Jan. 10, 2013); Monsanto 
Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 96–97 (Can.) (ignoring any harm 
to the farmer in holding him liable for patent infringement). 
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When such circumstances are present, the infringer is punished 
despite taking no action to infringe, which seems to go against the 
traditional notions of the Patent Act.  The original language of the 
Patent Act of 1793,16 as authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined 
patentable subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter.”17  The word “art” was later 
changed to “process,” but the usefulness requirement survived the 
patent statutes of 1836, 1870, 1874, and 1952.18 
This Comment argues that patent rights should be unenforceable 
when infringement is caused by the patented subject matter itself 
and is injurious.  Although patents are currently enforceable in such 
circumstances, self-replicating patented technology—with its ability 
to cause injury without human interaction—warrants a restriction in 
patent rights because of the unique way in which it fails the moral 
utility test.  Moreover, this Comment argues that patent rights in 
harmful pollen drift cases are also unenforceable under the 
doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, which prevents claimants 
from pursuing causes of action that arise in connection with an 
unlawful act. 
Part I of this Comment provides background on plant patents and 
self-replicating technology, as well as the mechanics of pollen drift.  
Part I also includes a case study on GM seed patent holder’s response 
to pollen drift.  Part II argues that patent rights should be 
unenforceable when the infringement is caused by the patented 
organism itself and creates an injury under the § 101 utility 
requirement of the Patent Act.  Alternatively, because the self-
replicating patented organism causes an unlawful act, such as trespass 
or nuisance, the infringement protection is void under the doctrine 
of ex turpi causa non oritur actio.  Part II then describes the harmful 
effects of allowing these infringement suits, which perpetuate the 
elimination of food variety and biodiversity.  Finally, this Comment 
concludes that unenforceability of patent rights in circumstances of 
pollen drift will provide a legal solution for farmers but will not 
necessarily solve the economic and biological harms of pollen drift 
from GM crops.  While this Comment focuses on the legal 
implications of GM seeds, it may be applied to other self-replicating 
technologies as well.  The reach of synthetic biology, the science that 
uses chemically-synthesized DNA to create biochemical organisms 
                                                          
 16. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
 17. Id. § 1; see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (referencing 
Jefferson’s contribution to the 1793 Act). 
 18. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09. 
LYND.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013  1:15 PM 
668 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:663 
with new characteristics, extends beyond agriculture to vaccines, 
medicines, biofuels, and biosecurity.19  Biotechnology may certainly 
benefit society, but its significant scientific advances also require 
advances in the law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The legal right to patent living organisms was initially extensively 
limited by statute, but the right has been greatly broadened by case 
law.20  While plants formerly were patentable only through specific 
statutes, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) began 
granting utility patents for plants in 1985.21  The Supreme Court 
confirmed the practice in 2001.22  Patents for self-replicating 
technology or living organisms are afforded an even more extensive 
right to exclude because patent rights are extended to each new 
generation of self-replicating technology—in the case of GM seeds, 
the seed’s progeny.23  Self-replicating technology creates new 
generations of itself without human intervention.24  If the new 
generations of the self-replicating technology are created on a third 
party’s real property or in combination with a third party’s personal 
property, the courts view the third party as infringing on the patent 
holder’s rights.25 
A. The Recent Change To Grant Utility Patents for Plants 
The Patent Act26 and the U.S. Constitution27 require that the 
subject of a utility patent be useful.  The Constitution grants Congress 
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
                                                          
 19. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS:  
THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 36, 56–72 (2010), 
available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo9019/PCSBI-Synthetic-Biology-
Report-12.16.10.pdf. 
 20. See infra Part I.A (discussing the recent expansion of patentable material to 
encompass plants). 
 21. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 447 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (granting 
the first utility patent for a plant after the Supreme Court granted a utility patent for 
a bacterium in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)). 
 22. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145 
(2001) (holding that newly-developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter). 
 23. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that patent rights extended to second generation seeds), No. 11-796 (U.S. 
argued Feb. 19, 2013). 
 24. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1591 (5th 
ed. 2011) (defining self-replicating as “replicating oneself or itself”). 
 25. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348. 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28  Congress 
exercised this power when it enacted the Patent Act, which in its 
current form states:  “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”29 
The utility requirement in § 101 of the Patent Act has historically 
consisted of three necessary types of utility:  specific,30 substantial,31 
and moral.32  Specific utility requires that the patented subject be 
capable of “provid[ing] a well-defined and particular benefit to the 
public.”33  In In re Fisher,34 for example, a patent was denied for 
“expressed sequence tags” relating to maize genes because there was 
nothing useful about the tags to the public; they were merely 
“hypothetical possibilities.”35  Thus, inventions must actually function 
as claimed and not simply be “theories” or “speculations.”36 
Substantial utility requires the patented subject to have a 
“significant and presently available benefit to the public.”37 This 
entails being applicable in the “real world” and not just beneficial for 
further research.38  In Brenner v. Manson,39 the Supreme Court found 
that even though the chemical compound at issue was not 
detrimental, it still did not merit a patent because its uses were still 
being researched; thus, it lacked substantial utility.40 
Though greatly limited and rarely applied today,41 the doctrine of 
moral utility holds that usefulness cannot be injurious.42  Moral utility is 
based on Lowell v. Lewis, where Justice Story held: 
                                                          
 28. Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (adding that 
Congress acts so as to positively affect society through the creation of new products 
that lead to increased employment and better lives). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 30. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1931). 
 31. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534; Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 32. Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925) 
(denying a patent for a fake seam up the back of stockings giving the look of higher 
quality stockings); Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 
1889) (denying a patent for a gambling machine); Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 
1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
 33. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 34. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 35. Id. at 1373–74. 
 36. Perrigo, 48 F.2d at 966. 
 37. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 38. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–36. 
 39. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
 40. Id. at 534–36. 
 41. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 42. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–33 (expounding on the definition of useful first 
given by Justice Story in Lowell); Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (“[T]he law requires . . . that the 
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[T]he law requires . . . that the invention should not be frivolous or 
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.  
The word “useful,” therefore, is incorporated into the act in 
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.  For instance, a new 
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to 
facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention.43 
Justice Story’s moral utility test was later limited in Fuller v. Berger,44 
which held that injuriousness prohibits patentability where it is the 
only use of the invention.45  Where a patent subject can be used for 
both injury and benefit, it is still patentable.46  The moral utility 
requirement has been used to deny patents for morally objectionable 
inventions such as gambling machines47 and deceptive inventions 
such as stockings with a fake seam.48  It has also been applied where 
there were “concerns about the morality of practicing the patent’s 
underlying subject matter”49 and “concerns regarding the morality of 
allowing anyone to limit the practice of the patent’s underlying 
subject matter.”50  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,51 the Supreme Court 
approved a patent for a “genetically engineered 
bacterium . . . capable of breaking down multiple components of 
crude oil”52 even though the living thing “may spread pollution and 
disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its 
practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life.”53  Although 
the Supreme Court rejected the application of moral utility as a basis 
                                                          
invention . . . not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being . . . of society.  The word 
‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or 
immoral.”); see also In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 978 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (finding that 
although the compound at issue lowered blood sugar, the drug’s high toxicity 
negated its utility). 
 43. See Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019 (emphasis added) (referring to the former 
Patent Act, with the same definition); see also Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–35 (building 
upon the standard from Lowell to define useful as more than just “not positively 
harmful to society” (emphasis added)).  But see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 
F.2d 920, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting an argument that patent protections are 
issued for the public good rather than for private benefit on the grounds that this 
interpretation is overbroad and would enable almost anyone to collaterally attack the 
validity of patents). 
 44. 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903). 
 45. Id. at 275. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889). 
 48. Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925). 
 49. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later:  Morality and Biotechnology in 
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 495 (2003) (listing “multi-cellular animals, 
human-animal chimera, and human cloning” as subject matters of concern). 
 50. Id. (citing “medical process methods”). 
 51. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 52. Id. at 305. 
 53. Id. at 316. 
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for denying patents for living microorganisms,54 moral utility has 
been applied for denying patents for part-human organisms.55  The 
PTO has rejected an application for a chimeric embryo made from 
both a human and non-human and applied Lowell in doing so, 
referring to the partially human organisms as “immoral” and as 
“monsters.”56 
Despite the remnants of moral utility, “the USPTO has issued 
patents to inventions that may arguably be illegal at least in certain 
jurisdictions.”57  The courts have justified this because “a patent is not 
the granting of a right to make, use or sell” the invention.58  Instead, 
a patent “grants only the right to exclude others from making, using 
or selling the patented device.”59  Thus, the object cannot become 
injurious without human intervention. 
When applied, all three forms of utility assess the invention 
overall—regardless of whether it is at the time of granting the 
patent60 or during trial.61  If utility is missing, it completely invalidates 
the patent—as opposed to restricting the patent rights only under 
particular circumstances, such as when human intervention uses a 
patented technology in an injurious way.62 
Similar to Justice Story’s interpretation that the law could not 
protect harmful inventions by awarding them a patent, in 1775, Lord 
Mansfield stated, “[n]o Court will lend its aid to a man who founds 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 316–17. 
 55. Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application No. 8,993,564, at 28 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
 56. Id. at 24–25, 28; see also Mark Dowie, Gods and Monsters, MOTHER JONES, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/01/gods-and-monsters (last visited Feb. 
20, 2013) (referring to the press conference held by the Commissioner of Patents 
regarding the chimera).  Section 33(a) of the America Invents Act now adds:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed 
to or encompassing a human organism.”  Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011). 
 57. Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select 
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) (statement 
of James Toupin, General Counsel, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); see, e.g., 
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill:  Why Legal Methods Cannot Be 
Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 365–66 (2007) (“During Prohibition, for 
example, a patent was issued for a method of producing alcohol.  More recently, 
patents have been awarded for radar detectors, cock-fighting equipment . . . all of 
which are contraband in at least some states and/or under federal law.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 58. Little Mule Corp. v. Lug All Co., 254 F.2d 268, 272–73 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 61. Id. § 282 (allowing for a defendant to challenge the validity of an existing 
patent as a defense to infringement); id. § 302 (allowing the PTO to reexamine an 
already-issued patent to reassess validity). 
 62. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (vacating the lower court’s finding of infringement because the patent was 
invalid for lack of utility). 
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his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.”63  The 
doctrine, known as ex turpi causa non oritur actio,64 holds that “[n]o 
cause of action can arise out of an immoral (or illegal) inducement 
(or consideration).”65  This doctrine embodies the notion that 
enforcing a right that simultaneously violates the law undermines the 
rule of law.66  Ex turpi causa is commonly applied in contracts67 and 
torts.68  The act need not violate a criminal statute.69  A contract, for 
example, is considered illegal under the doctrine “if either its 
formation or performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed 
to public policy.”70  Moreover, the doctrine applies to immoral and 
illegal actions, both malum prohibitum or malum per se.71  Thus, both 
                                                          
 63. Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.) 1121; 1 Cowp. 342, 343 
(commonly cited as the origin of the ex turpi causa doctrine). 
 64. See Nahas v. George, 99 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1951) (translating the general 
maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio as “out of fraud no action arises”); see also, 
McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654 (1899) (holding the maxim to mean that 
the law will not lend its aid to a claim based on its own violation); Citizens’ Nat’l 
Bank of Chickasha v. Mitchell, 103 P. 720, 730 (Okla. 1909) (same). 
 65. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (3d ed. 1969). 
 66. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW:  CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 47 
(2005) (explaining the legality principle, which embodies the notion that the law 
must prevent arbitrariness by being clearly defined and consistently enforced so as to 
avoid a situation where the public is unclear on what or which illegal actions will be 
punished).  Although the principle is often applied in criminal law, the same effect 
will result when the laws broken by pollen drift are ignored, such as when patent 
infringement is at play. 
 67. See Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 
1991) (voiding a contract provision that prevented a person from running for office 
as being against public policy); see also Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 833–34 (3d Cir. 
1982) (invalidating a contractual provision purporting to preclude a legal services 
group from recovering attorneys’ fees following a successful civil rights litigation 
against the state because it violated public policy (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 178–179 (1981))); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:4, at 980–93 nn.15–22 (4th ed. 2009) 
(listing a multitude of federal and state cases that have applied the doctrine to void 
contracts as against public policy). 
 68. See Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers:  Should an 
Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived To Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
53, 82–86 (1995) (applying ex turpi causa to tort law in the United States via 
proximate causation and public policy).  Despite its traditional usage, the application 
of the doctrine in U.S. tort law is on the decline.  See id. at 86–87. 
 69. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932).  This statement of the law has 
been refined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178. 
 70. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 178 (abandoning any reference to the illegality of the bargain and 
instead focusing on whether the contract is unenforceable on public policy 
grounds). 
 71. Jones v. Dinkins, 76 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ga. 1953) (applying the doctrine); 
Sewell v. Norris, 58 S.E. 637, 639 (Ga. 1907) (same); Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis. 
252, 254 (1872) (listing multiple cases affirming the doctrine’s underlying 
principles). 
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the moral utility requirement and ex turpi causa are concerned with 
legal assistance to harmful causes.72 
 The legal protection for patenting living organisms has undergone 
several iterations in the past century, each providing more expansive 
exclusion rights than the last.  Living organisms were not initially 
granted utility patents; instead, patent protection for plants began in 
1930 with the Plant Patent Act73 (PPA).  The PPA limited patent 
protection for plant germplasm to asexually reproduced plants 
(excluding tuber propagated plants)—those produced by grafting or 
cuttings and usually sold through a nursery, not seeds, and their 
progeny.74  Because many agricultural plants are sexually reproduced, 
or tuber propagated plants, the PPA protection was very limited and 
did not include many staple or commodity crops such as corn, wheat, 
or rice.75  The PPA only required that asexually reproduced plants be 
“distinct and new.”76 
Forty years after the creation of the PPA, the Plant Variety 
Protection Act of 197077 (PVPA) extended patent-like protection to 
sexually reproduced plants and seeds of novel varieties.78  The 
standard for obtaining a PVPA patent-like certificate was less 
stringent than the standard for obtaining a utility patent.  The PVPA 
omitted the non-obvious and beneficial requirements and instead 
                                                          
 72. Compare Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (discussing the moral utility requirement for utility patents, 
under which patent protections only apply to inventions that do not harm society), 
with Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.) 1121; 1 Cowp. 342, 343 
(creating the ex turpi causa doctrine under which courts do not allow recovery for 
injury caused by a person’s own harmful conduct). 
 73. Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (current version at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006)).  The current version of the PPA reads:  “Whoever 
invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of 
plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, 
other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, 
may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006). 
 74. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (applying the PPA of 1930 
to hold that propagation by asexual reproduction is defined “by grafting, budding, 
cuttings, layering, division, and the like, but not by seeds” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 71-
1129, at 1 (1930))). 
 75. See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492–2000, at 132–33 (2d ed. 2004) (suggesting that 
Congress may have excluded sexually reproducing and tuber propagating plants 
from the PPA because it did not want to grant monopoly-like patent protection to 
staple food crops). 
 76. Plant Patent Act, § 1. 
 77. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–
2582 (2006)). 
 78. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2006) (extending protection to sexually reproduced 
plants, which are often the largest commodity crops in the United States, such as 
corn, wheat, and rice). 
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only required that the product be new, distinct, uniform, and stable.79  
However, the PVPA also provided less protection to the patent holder 
than a utility patent because under the PVPA, seed saving and 
research do not constitute infringement.80  For example, a farmer 
could save and replant patented seeds under the PVPA, but could not 
sell the seeds.81 
In the PVPA, Congress created a specific patent-like certificate, 
distinct from utility patents.82  However, as the GM seed industry grew 
in the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural companies began applying for 
utility patents for their seed instead of PVPA certificates.83  Although 
utility patents required a higher non-obviousness and usefulness 
standard, the utility patent was favorable for the seed companies 
because it did not include exceptions for research or seed saving.84 
 The Supreme Court’s Chakrabarty decision and the underlying facts 
of the case provide an example of the industry attempting to use 
utility patents for a non-plant organism.85  In that case, the Supreme 
Court strictly interpreted the text of the Patent Act in extending 
utility patents to the genetically engineered bacterium, despite the 
USPTO’s disagreement.86  The USPTO first argued that the Patent 
Act must exclude living things (such as bacteria or seeds); otherwise 
the PPA and PVPA would not be necessary to authorize patent 
protection for plants.87  However, the majority interpreted Congress’s 
creation of the PPA and PVPA as an attempt to decrease the amount 
of detail in a description, especially for more difficult categories such 
as plants, and to explain that the work product of a plant breeder, 
though “in aid of nature,” is patentable.88  Second, the USPTO 
argued that Congress must explicitly name microorganisms as 
patentable because they were unforeseen at the time the Patent Act 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. §§ 2543–2544 (providing a right to save seed for personal use and a 
right to breed protected plants for research). 
 81. Compare id. § 2541(a)(1) (providing that selling protected plants constitutes 
infringement), with id. § 2543 (indicating that seeds may be saved for replanting). 
 82. Id. §§ 2321–2582. 
 83. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 447 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (granting 
for the first time a utility patent for a plant—in this case a maize plant—with high 
tryptophan levels). 
 84. Compare 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543–2544 (containing an exception for research or seed 
saving), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (omitting any direct reference to plants or other life 
forms). 
 85. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 86. Id. at 316–18 (explaining how the question before the court was narrow and 
asserting that policy arguments on the dangers of patenting life forms should be 
discussed by Congress). 
 87. Id. at 310–11. 
 88. Id. at 312 (quoting S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 7 (1930)). 
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was enacted89 and because bacteria are explicitly excluded from the 
PVPA.90  The Court disagreed that unforeseen subject matter 
required explicit naming, asserting that the broad language of the 
Patent Act accounted for unforeseen subject matter.91  The 5–4 
majority held that because the respondent “produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature,” the bacterium was eligible for a utility patent under the 
Patent Act.92 
Following Chakrabarty, the USPTO denied utility patent 
applications for self-replicating (sexually and asexually reproduced) 
plants, reasoning that Congress intended them to be covered 
separately under the PPA and PVPA.93  However, the PTO Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) decided in the 1985 case 
Ex parte Hibberd94 that sexually reproducing plants were indeed 
patentable.95  The Board applied a statutory construction rule 
requiring that when two acts govern the same issue, courts must “give 
effect to both unless there is . . . [an] ‘irreconcilable’” difference 
between them.96  Thus, the Board reasoned that the PPA and PVPA 
did not exclude issuing utility patents for plants.97  Subsequently, the 
USPTO began accepting utility patent applications for plants.98 
In 2001, the Supreme Court decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.99 upheld the use of utility patents for 
plants using the same reasoning as the Board in Hibberd.100  Both 
courts agreed that because Congress failed to explicitly exclude 
plants in the Patent Act’s provision on utility patents and failed to 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 314–15. 
 90. Id. (arguing that Congress did not intend to include non-plant “living” 
organisms, such as bacterium, in the PVPA); see 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1970) (“The 
breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, 
or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his successor in 
interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection . . . .”). 
 91. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315. 
 92. Id. at 310 (noting that the bacterium also had “the potential for significant 
utility”). 
 93. See KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS:  CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 42 (2008). 
 94. 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.T.A.I. 1985). 
 95. Id. at 443–48 (rejecting the argument that Congress intended to exclude 
sexually reproducing plants from 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 96. Id. at 445–46. 
 97. Id. at 444–46. 
 98. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 12 (arguing that the USPTO began 
granting utility patents for plants even though “Congress had never given the U.S. 
PTO authority to grant utility patents for sexually reproducing plants”). 
 99. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 100. Compare id. at 138 (determining that utility patents cover a larger scope than 
the PVPA’s patent-like certificates), with Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444–45 
(finding that Congress did not limit the scope of utility patents). 
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state that the PPA and PVPA were the exclusive protections available 
for plants, extending patents to plants is not contrary to 
congressional intent.101  The Court also stated that the USPTO had 
been issuing utility patents for plants for sixteen years—since 
Hibberd—with no disagreement from Congress.102  By affirming 
multiple provisions for patents or patent-like protections for living 
organisms, these cases encouraged the commoditization of seeds and 
the expansion of biotechnology products.103 
B. GM Seeds Capable of Pollen Drift and Saving Seeds 
There are at least two GM products relevant in the context of 
pollen drift:  cross-pollinated herbicide-tolerant GM seeds and cross-
pollinated insect-resistant GM seeds.104  Herbicide-tolerant GM seeds 
include the Roundup Ready system through which GM seeds, such as 
wheat, are genetically modified to resist the herbicide Roundup.105  
This allows the farmer to spray Roundup on the entire field, thereby 
killing the weeds, but not the GM wheat.106  Roundup Ready 
agricultural seeds include alfalfa, canola, cotton, and sugar beets.107 
 The second group includes insect-resistant GM seeds such as corn, 
containing the bacterium bacillus thuringiensis, known as “Bt Corn.”108  
                                                          
 101. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 138; Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444–45. 
 102. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 144–45; see also Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 443–44. 
 103. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 75, at 282 (“The legal and technical capacities 
are now in place that will permit capital to realize the apotheosis of the seed as a 
commodity-form.”). 
 104. See Agricultural Seeds, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages 
/Monsanto-agricultural-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (listing their agricultural 
seed products, including canola, corn, cotton, and soybeans); see also Glossary, supra 
note 2 (explaining that “trait stacking” produce seeds are insect-resistant and 
“herbicide toleran[t]”). 
 105. See Roundup Ready System, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanag 
ement/Pages/roundup-ready-system.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that 
Roundup herbicide works in conjunction with Roundup-resistant seeds). 
 106. See John Russnogle, Roundup Ready Soybean System Simply Works, CORN & SOYBEAN 
DIGEST (Aug. 1, 1998), http://cornandsoybeandigest.com/roundup-ready-soybean-
system-simply-works (explaining that farmers only need to spray Roundup Ultra about 
a month after planting Roundup Ready seeds). 
 107. Roundup Ready System, supra note 105.  Monsanto also sells Roundup Ready 
soybeans, but because they are self-pollinating, the soybeans are not subject to pollen 
drift.  Tim Van Pelt, Note, Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate 
Mechanism for Allocating the Cost of Pollen Drift?, 31 J. CORP. L. 567, 586 (2006).  
However, their seeds could still be blown or moved via animal and machinery and 
thus, still contaminate other fields.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text 
(outlining the different ways pollen drift occurs). 
 108. See Genuity Bollgard II Cotton, GENUITY, http://www.genuity.com/cotton/Pages/ 
GenuityBollgardIICotton.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (asserting that Genuity Bollgard 
II Cotton, manufactured by Monsanto, is the best Bt cotton plant at reducing damage by 
cotton-eating worms); see also Glossary, supra note 2 (describing that Bt is naturally found 
in soil, but Bt GM plants are designed to produce its fatal protein themselves). 
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The bacterium has been trans-genetically inserted into the seeds in 
order to kill certain insects and pests.109  There are additional GM 
traits110 that change nutritional content and attempt to increase 
yield111 in the plant.  Regardless of which genetically modified traits a 
seed contains, farmers using any patented seed from a patent holder, 
such as Monsanto,112 DuPont,113 or Syngenta,114 must sign a limited 
license to use the patented seeds; the limited license for Monsanto is 
called the Master Technology/Stewardship Agreement (MTSA).115  
The MTSA prohibits saving any seeds reproduced by the GM 
plants.116  Saving seeds is a conventional farming practice that ensures 
the continuation of the breed, sustainably provides seeds for the next 
year’s crop, and also allows for genetic diversification of seeds to 
                                                          
 109. See Glossary, supra note 2 (detailing how Bt kills insects by creating a protein 
that harms their digestive systems); see also Cotton Seeds, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/cotton-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013) (noting that Genuity Bollgard II cotton seeds specifically protect the plants 
from worms).  Upland and Pima cotton, both genetically modified into Bt cotton 
(referred to as Bollgard II) by Monsanto, are “mostly self-pollinated,” aside from rare 
instances of cross-pollination through insects and wind.  ROBERT B. HUTMACHER ET 
AL., AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CALIFORNIA SERIES, PUB. NO. 8191, METHODS TO 
ENABLE THE COEXISTENCE OF DIVERSE COTTON PRODUCTION SYSTEMS  1 (2006), available 
at http://www.anrcatalog.ucdavis.edu/pdf/8191.pdf; see also MONSANTO, TUG 2013:  
U.S. TECHNOLOGY USE GUIDE 13 (2013) [hereinafter TUG], available at 
http://www.monsanto.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Technology-Use-Guide.pdf 
(clarifying U.S. law on exporting and marketing Bt cotton due to different laws 
regarding biotechnology). 
 110. Agricultural Seeds, supra note 104; see Glossary, supra note 2 (explaining that the 
agricultural seed technology industry can now contain “stacked” traits combining 
several modifications to a seed’s genetic makeup, such as drought resistance). 
 111. Do GM Crops Increase Yield, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/ 
Pages/do-gm-crops-increase-yield.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“GM crops generally 
have higher yields due to both breeding and biotechnology.”).  But see INT’L ASSESSMENT 
OF AGRIC. KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH. FOR DEV., AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS:  GLOBAL 
REPORT 95 (2008), available at http://www.agassessment.org/reports/IAASTD/EN/ 
Agriculture%20at%20a%20Crossroads_Global%20Report%20(English).pdf (finding that 
the excessive costs and low yields of GM agriculture was outperformed by traditional agro-
ecological farming practices). 
 112. See MTSA, supra note 7 (requiring all growers of Monsanto seeds to sign the 
licensing agreement); see also Andrew Pollack, As Patent Ends, a Seed’s Use Will Survive, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at B3 (asserting that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans 
will be the first Bt plant to go public since the widespread use of biotechnology 
began in the 1990s); Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that Roundup trait will go off patent and 
become available to the public in 2014). 
 113. Jack Kaskey, DuPont Sends in Former Cops To Enforce Seed Patents, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 28, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-28/dupont-
sends-in-former-cops-to-enforce-seed-patents-commodities.html. 
 114. SYNGENTA SEEDS, INC. STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT (2009), available at 
http://www.legendseeds.com/download/Syngenta_Stewardship_Agreement_2010.pdf. 
 115. See MTSA, supra note 7 (containing the subtitle “Limited Use License”). 
 116. Id. 
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confront future problems.117  The MTSA also prohibits any future 
use, sale, or receipt of the seeds.118  Additionally, the Center for Food 
Safety reported cases where farmers were unaware of the terms of the 
license agreement because they were never asked to sign a MTSA by 
the intermediary salesman.119 
But it is not the license alone that prohibits seed saving.  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held in Monsanto Co. v. 
McFarling,120 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,121 and Monsanto Co. v. Bowman122 
that self-replicated GM seeds are protected by the patent as well.  
Defendants argued that second generation seed should not have 
patent protection due to the doctrine of patent exhaustion, which 
establishes that the right to exclusively sell the patented product is 
exhausted by a single, unrestricted sale of that product.123  The 
doctrine also allows for modifications to the product.124  However, the 
Federal Circuit found that both in cases where the sale was restricted 
                                                          
 117. See INT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF FOOD & AGRIC., MANIFESTO ON THE FUTURE 
OF SEEDS 6–8 (2006) [hereinafter MANIFESTO], available at http://www.arsia.toscana.it 
/petizione/documents/semi/futurosemi_eng.pdf (proclaiming that preventing 
farmers from saving and exchanging seeds, as they have historically done, is 
detrimental not only to the agricultural way of life, but to food security); see also 7 
U.S.C. § 2543 (2006) (allowing a seed saving exception under the PVPA); Van Pelt, 
supra note 107, at 576 (stating that under the “saved-seed exemption,” farmers 
could replant saved seeds from protected plants that were legally purchased and 
planted on their own farms, although the scope of the “saved-seed exemption” 
narrowed over time to include only the number of seeds sufficient to plant their 
crop in the next season). 
 118. MTSA, supra note 7.  The agreement further allows review of the farmer’s 
U.S. Department of Agriculture-Farm Service Agency (USDA-FSA) crop report, 
which permits Monsanto to view the farmer’s financial state.  CFS REPORT, supra note 
13, at 17 (explaining that access to the FSA form helps Monsanto identify 
neighboring farms, determine how much seed the farmer bought, and determine 
how many seeds the farmer planted).  The company can also demand financial 
receipts of purchased and sold seed to be handed over if it believes a farmer has 
saved seed; farmers must release this financial information within seven days, and in 
some cases a twenty-four hour turnaround is required.  See TUG, supra note 109, at 2–
3 (declaring that if Monsanto has a “reasonable” belief that a farmer saves seeds, it 
“may inspect and test” all of the farmer’s fields).  The agreement contains a choice of 
law provision and a forum selection clause requiring that any infringement lawsuits 
be brought in the Eastern District of Missouri.  MTSA, supra note 7.  This clause only 
applies to farmers who have signed the agreement and not to unsuspecting 
neighbors who never purchased seed, but were victims of pollen drift.  CFS REPORT, 
supra note 13, at 44 (stating that Monsanto cannot enforce the terms of the 
technology agreement when farmers have not signed it, though Monsanto may sue 
the farmers for patent infringement). 
 119. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 44 (asserting that forged signatures on the 
technology agreement are common). 
 120. 302 F.3d 1291, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 121. 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 122. 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011), No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013). 
 123. Supra notes 120–22; see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 
617, 625 (2008) (defining patent exhaustion). 
 124. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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by the license and where it was unrestricted, the patent still was not 
exhausted by the self-replicated, second generation seed.125 
C. GM Pollen Drift Contamination and Patent Infringement 
Patents may be unintentionally infringed and the MTSA 
inadvertently breached when pollen drift occurs. Pollen drift is the 
cross-pollination of agricultural commodities and can be caused by 
the movement of animals or shared equipment,126 by the wind 
carrying plants and seeds to other farms and contaminating the 
plants, or by planted, but dormant, seeds.127  Seeds can lie dormant in 
a field for several years before sprouting; therefore, a field containing 
previously licensed seeds can violate the patent years later once the 
dormant seeds sprout.128  Only total replacement of the topsoil can 
fully prevent dormant seeds from sprouting.129 
Pollen drift occurs without any intent or action on behalf of the 
alleged infringer.130  However, courts have refused to move away from 
the strict liability standard of infringement.131  In some cases, 
however, courts have considered intent when awarding damages.132  
Even if intent is considered when awarding damages and the accused 
farmer does not have to pay damages, the patent rights can still be 
costly because the farmer is not awarded legal fees and must still 
remove the contamination from his fields.133  Removal can leave the 
                                                          
 125. Compare Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345, 1349 (finding no exhaustion where the 
sale was unrestricted), with Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336 (finding no exhaustion where 
the sale was restricted). 
 126. See The World According to Monsanto (ARTE France television broadcast Mar. 
11, 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6_DbVdVo-k (discussing 
the potential endangerment of Mexico’s traditional corn growing region, Oaxaca, 
because GM corn has contaminated parts of the region despite the illegality of 
cultivation in the region).  Experts believe that because under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, Mexico must permit GM corn from the United States to be 
imported for consumption (not for agricultural use), discarded GM corn was simply 
in the area and began growing.  Id. 
 127. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds, & Deeds:  Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 297 (2003). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 294 (asserting that when soil remains untilled, such as occurs in 
prairies, canola seeds are likely to lie dormant for “six to ten years”). 
 130. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining that pollen drift from 
GM plants is natural). 
 131. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Hartkamp, No. 00-164-P, 2001 WL 34079482, at *2 
(E.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2001) (stipulating that intent is only taken into account to 
determine increasing damages for “willful infringement”). 
 132. See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(citing Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982)); Lam, Inc. v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474–75 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Rantanen, supra 
note 14, at 1605–09 (discussing damage awards affected by willful infringement). 
 133. See Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 105 (Can.) 
(sustaining an injunctive order against the farmer from using Monsanto’s GM seeds); 
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farmer without seed for the following years.134  More globally, 
however, permitting infringement suits even when the court does not 
award damages creates a system through which the high risk of using 
conventional seeds and being sued due to unintended pollen drift 
incentivizes farmers to use GM seeds.135 
Already, some farmers are taking measures to protect against 
contamination and potential infringement suits, which can cost tens 
of thousands of dollars.136  Conventional farmers may take on the 
burden of creating a buffer zone around their crops to prevent 
pollen drift, attempt to rent machinery that does not also work with 
GM seeds or has been thoroughly cleaned between uses, or take 
other costly measures to prevent contamination.137  Nonetheless, even 
these measures may be insufficient, as contamination may go 
unnoticed for years and may occur over large geographic areas,138 
meaning that many conventional seed companies can no longer 
certify that their products are not GM contaminated.139  Yet the 
burden for finding a market is always on the farmer—whether his 
crop is contaminated or not.140  The burden to prevent 
                                                          
Aoki, supra note 127, at 297 (describing the costs of removing contamination from 
fields, even though it is almost impossible to remove all contamination). 
 134. First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 38 (explaining that after 
contamination removal, the affected field cannot be used for many years). 
 135. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 28–30 (emphasizing that Monsanto 
threatens farmers with expensive and time consuming lawsuits, even when they have 
little to no verifiable evidence of infringement, to pressure farmers into buying their 
GM seeds); see also Van Pelt, supra note 107, at 583, 588–89 (analyzing the Coase 
theorem, which posits that parties do not utilize the most beneficial and efficient 
solutions due to the potential for legal fees and liability costs, to determine that 
government regulation would be better than infringement lawsuits for ensuring the 
allocation of costs onto the patent holder because of the varying risks of 
unintentional cross-pollination). 
 136. See, e.g., CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 41 (offering the example of a North 
Dakota farmer who spent a total of $12,200 in one year on prevention strategies after 
spending around $200,000 on legal fees when Monsanto sued his farm in 2000). 
 137. See TUG, supra note 109, at 8 (stating that according to “accepted practice,” 
farmers who grow non-GM crops should utilize borders and plan different growing 
times to prevent unintentional cross-pollination). 
 138. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 39 (citing a British study that found oilseed 
rape pollen could travel sixteen miles); Andrew Pollack, Can Biotech Crops Be Good 
Neighbors?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at WK12 (stating that GM bentgrass seeds can 
travel thirteen miles and cross-pollinate with other plants); supra note 127 and 
accompanying text (noting that canola seeds may remain dormant for six to ten 
years before germination). 
 139. See The “Non-GMO Project Verified” Seal, NON-GMO PROJECT, 
http://www.nongmoproject.org/learn-more/understanding-our-seal (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2013) (allowing 0.9% GM contamination in products certified as “Non-
GMO” verified, in accordance with European Union guidelines, because 
contamination is unavoidable). 
 140. See TUG, supra note 109, at 8 (asserting that the grower of “Identity 
Preserved” crops, such as organic or non-GM crops, must prevent them from being 
contaminated). 
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contamination also lies with the third party farmer instead of the 
licensed seed user or patent holder; additionally, the cost of 
attempting to prevent contamination is lower than the legal fees and 
possible damages from an infringement lawsuit regardless of the 
likelihood of contamination or a lawsuit.141 
Illustrating the plight of the third party farmer is Organic Seed 
Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto,142 a recently dismissed case from 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.  The 
case involved eighty-three plaintiffs, including organic farmers, seed 
businesses, and farming associations, who sought a declaratory 
judgment to prevent what they saw as inevitable infringement cases 
against them for unintentional contamination.143  The court 
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.144  First, the 
district court accepted Monsanto’s assertion that it will not sue 
farmers who are unintentionally contaminated with trace amounts of 
its products, and second, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to 
show that the 144 prior defendants sued by Monsanto were in like 
circumstances to themselves, thereby holding that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to a declaratory judgment.145  However, because intent is 
not required under the Patent Act,146 Monsanto’s assertion that it will 
not sue unintentional infringers does not mean that it cannot sue 
unintentional infringers or that it would not prevail in such suits.147 
D. Infringement Investigations, Settlements, and Lawsuits for Pollen Drift 
GM seed companies often have strict patent and license 
enforcement investigations and procedures.148  While most cases 
settle out of court, settlements can often include a requirement that 
the farmer purchase and use the patent holder’s seeds in the 
future.149  Monsanto reports that it filed 144 lawsuits in the United 
                                                          
 141. See, e.g., CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 19, 41; see also Van Pelt, supra note 107, 
at 586–87. 
 142. 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), No. 12-1298 (Fed. Cir. argued Jan. 10, 2013). 
 143. Id. at 548–49. 
 144. Id. at 556. 
 145. Id. at 548. 
 146. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 147. See, e.g., Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 
1968) (“It is, of course, elementary, that [a patent] infringement may be entirely 
inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent.”). 
 148. See Farmers Reporting Farmers—Part 2, MONSANTO (Oct. 10, 2008), 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Farmers-Reporting-Farmers-Part-
2.aspx (discussing the procedures of the anonymous tip line and encouraging 
farmers to report their neighbor farmers for breach of license or for patent 
infringement). 
 149. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm on Farmers’ 
Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A1 (reporting that nearly half of 
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States between 1997 and April 2010;150 this averages about thirteen 
lawsuits per year.151  To date, only nine cases have gone to trial, and 
all have ended in victory for Monsanto.152  Those farmers who do not 
settle often face bankruptcy.153 
Monsanto states that the company only pursues cases where it 
believes the farmer has intentionally saved seed.154  However, the 
question of intent is irrelevant for patent infringement, and farmers 
who never signed a license agreement, but rather whose farm was 
contaminated by pollen drift, may also be categorized as intentionally 
saving seed if they harvest the contaminated crop and replant it the 
following season.155  The strict liability of patent infringement is 
traditionally justified by the recoup of investment funds in the 
invention’s development and the requirement that the invention be 
released into the public domain within twenty years.156 
Harvesting and replanting seeds from contaminated crops was 
exactly what defendant Percy Schmeiser had done in Monsanto 
Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,157 a case from the Supreme Court of 
Canada.158  Schmeiser grew conventional canola, while five of his 
neighboring farmers grew Roundup Ready canola, but through 
pollen drift, his conventional crop was contaminated with GM 
pollen.159  The season after his crop was contaminated, he planted a 
new canola crop using seed saved from his contaminated harvest.160  
                                                          
the company’s 525 investigations had been settled); see also CFS REPORT, supra note 
13, at 30 (explaining the strict and often confidential terms of such settlements). 
 150. Organic Seed Growers, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-
save-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 153. CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 42. 
 154. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, supra note 152. 
 155. See, e.g., Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 87 (Can.). 
 156. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that intent is required only if the patent holder seeks enhanced damages or 
attorneys’ fees for willful infringement (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 
520 U.S. 17 (1997))).  But see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its 
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 833–34 (2002) (suggesting 
patent law is actually a modified strict liability system where liability often depends 
upon receipt of actual or constructive notice of the patent). 
 157. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). 
 158. Canadian patent law is very similar to U.S. patent law.  See Carie-Megan Flood, 
Note, Pollen Drift and Potential Causes of Action, 28 J. CORP. L. 473, 476 (2003) 
(analogizing the two bodies of law and finding that Monsanto’s licensing agreement 
had similar applicability in both countries); cf. Aristech Chem. Int’l Ltd. v. Acrylic 
Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 629 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting the similarity between the 
Canadian and United States legal systems). 
 159. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 5–6. 
 160. Id. at para. 61. 
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Schmeiser’s routine spraying of Roundup herbicide to kill unwanted 
weeds in the ditches alongside his fields revealed a large number of 
Roundup-resistant canola plants.161  Schmeiser conducted testing and 
found that approximately sixty percent of his plants were resistant to 
Roundup herbicide.162  In the same growing season, an investigator 
from Monsanto took seeds from near Schmeiser’s fields.163  Tests on 
these samples revealed a significant amount of Roundup resistance.164 
Monsanto sued Schmeiser in 1998 for infringement of its Canadian 
patent on the Roundup Ready gene, alleging Schmeiser had grown 
and sold canola plants containing the gene without a license or 
consent.165  Though Schmeiser’s crop was contaminated through 
pollen drift, he did sell the contaminated canola and even saved and 
replanted the Roundup seeds, just as he would have done with his 
conventional crop in the following growing season.166  He alleged, 
that he did not however, use Roundup spray on the contaminated 
crop and thus, did not benefit from the GM seed containing the 
Roundup Ready gene.167  On the issue of infringement, the Supreme 
Court of Canada168 determined it was irrelevant whether Schmeiser 
intended to use or even benefit from the patented gene and thus 
applied the strict liability doctrine.  When assessing damages, the 
court did hold that Schmeiser had not financially profited from the 
harvesting of the crop grown from the patented technology and did 
not require Schmeiser to pay any damages to Monsanto, despite the 
finding of patent infringement.169  However, he still incurred 
                                                          
 161. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, para. 22 (Can.), aff’d, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 6, 63. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at para 1. 
 166. Id. at para. 63. 
 167. Id. at para. 81. 
 168. Compare Ridout & Maybee LLP, Canada, in MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF 
APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 23, 
23 (Arnold & Siedsma eds., Supp. 2012) (excluding intent when defining Canadian 
patent infringement as “making, constructing, using or selling” any patented 
invention within Canada during the term of the patent), with Kenyon & Kenyon, 
USA, in MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE 
MARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, supra, at 30, 30 (excluding intent when defining 
U.S. patent infringement as making, using, offering to sell, selling or importing any 
patented invention within the U.S. during the term of the patent). 
 169. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 104–05; see also id. at para. 87 
(questioning why Schmeiser chose to harvest the Roundup Ready plants he found on 
his land, save the seeds, and plant them the next year).  If courts were to continue 
this model of paying for infringement when and if benefits are incurred, it would be 
more costly and easier to use in other situations such as contamination by product 
lines that feature higher yielding corn.  In contrast, for Roundup Ready crops, 
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significant costs, as he was required to pay legal fees, to rip up his 
land to remove the seeds, and thus to lose that year’s income and 
seeds for future years.170 
II. POLLEN DRIFT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A RESTRICTION IN 
PATENT RIGHTS BECAUSE THE SELF-REPLICATING INVENTION CAUSES 
THE INFRINGEMENT 
When utility patents were created, life was not patentable.171  There 
were no lab-rat patents172 or reproducing seed patents.173  Now that 
self-replicating organisms174 are patentable, the question of whether 
enforcement rights are appropriate in all circumstances remains.175  
This is particularly pressing in situations where the patented subject 
itself has caused the infringement with no human interaction, or 
when the infringement simultaneously arises in connection with 
illegal acts such as trespass or nuisance attributable to the patent 
holder.  Moreover, an alternative means to patent law should be 
                                                          
benefits are only incurred if the farmer uses Roundup herbicide.  See supra note 105 
(explaining the Roundup system). 
 170. However, when Schmeiser’s land was contaminated again several years later, 
he removed the contamination and sued Monsanto for the cost of removal and for 
trespass.  See Percy Schmeiser Turns the Tables on Monsanto, ISLAND TIDES, Apr. 3, 2008, at 
3, available at http://www.islandtides.com/assets/reprint/env_20080403.pdf.  The 
company settled with him for the cost of removal, approximately $600.  Id. 
 171. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property 
Protections for Living Matter:  Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for 
Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 88, 99 (1995) (describing the expansion of 
patent law to include plants in 1930 and animals in 1988); see also Stephanie M. 
Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting:  Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property 
Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 12 (2005) (“The 
unique nature of a property that can contaminate the property of others and 
reproduce on its own was not considered by lawmakers when they drafted the Patent 
Act.”). 
 172. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 171, at 99 (crediting the “Harvard mouse” of 
1988 as the first multi-cellular living organism to be patented); see also U.S. Patent 
No. 4,736,866 col. 2 l. 30–42, col. 3 l. 16–48 (filed June 22, 1984) (describing the 
“Harvard Mouse,” or “OncoMouse,” as an animal genetically altered to be more 
susceptible to cancer, making it ideal for cancer research). 
 173. See Joe Miller, Patent Law:  How Patents Grew Over Time To Include Living 
Organisms, COOKING UP A STORY, http://cookingupastory.com/patent-law-how-
patents-grew-over-time-to-include-living-organisms (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) 
(outlining the development of patent law and its incorporation of reproducing seed 
patents in the PVPA of 1970). 
 174. Referring to seed technology, but also including patented animals, 
bacteria, and even DNA molecules.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that 
DNA molecules separated by geneticists are patentable technology under 35 
U.S.C. § 101), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 12-398). 
 175. Bernhardt, supra note 171, at 12 (arguing that the strict liability standard 
applied to infringement of intellectual property is not appropriate in the context of 
tangible property). 
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found to manage any benefits inadvertently received from the pollen 
drift such as resistance to pathogens.176 
This Section first argues that because the self-replicating organism 
through pollen drift itself has caused the infringement, a restriction 
of patent rights is warranted in order to reconcile moral utility with 
specific and substantial utility.  Second, this Section borrows the legal 
doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio from contract law to assert 
that unlawful trespass attributable to the patent holder would 
prohibit him or her from seeking a cause of action for patent 
infringement.  Third, this Section addresses an unintentional 
infringer benefiting from the infringement and explains why 
enforcing patent rights for pollen drift is harmful to biodiversity and 
the economy. 
A. When Self-Replicating Inventions Themselves Cause Infringement and 
Injury, the Patent Holder’s Exclusion Rights Should Be Restricted in Order To 
Reconcile the Three Types of Utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
Under the current application of the § 101 usefulness requirement 
and Chakrabarty, it is clear that GM seeds are patentable and pollen 
drift results in unintentional infringement on behalf of the farmer 
whose crops are contaminated.  Although the Court in Chakrabarty 
held that living organisms merited no new test for patentability,177 the 
unique self-replicating ability to cause infringement without any 
human interaction should warrant a restriction of exclusion rights in 
order to reconcile the three types of utility. 
In Fuller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nearly 
voided Justice Story’s moral utility test.178  The Fuller court held that as 
long as the invention is capable of some use that is not harmful, it is 
patentable.179  The decisions in Brenner and Fisher further specified 
patentable utility as being specific and substantial.180  The Supreme 
Court in Brenner held that looking to harm alone was insufficient 
because there are some inventions, which are not positively harmful, 
but are still not useful; thus, passing the injurious branch of the 
moral utility test (as qualified by Fuller) was necessary but not 
sufficient.181 
                                                          
 176. Infra Part II.C. 
 177. Id. at 315. 
 178. Fuller v. Baker, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 534–36 (1966); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also MPEP § 2107 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf. 
 181. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 533 (stating that there are “many things in this world 
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However, even inventions having only injurious utility are now 
eligible for patents.182  Since the Fuller decision, inventions only 
capable of being used to deceive the public and inventions only 
capable of being used to commit an illegal activity have been granted 
patents.183  With regard to “deceptive” patents, the moral utility test 
has been virtually eliminated.184  The Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip, 
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.185 held in part that a beverage dispenser that 
concealed the mixing elements while displaying a fake pre-mixed 
reservoir was patentable despite its deceptive nature.186  The court 
likened the device to cubic zirconium and synthetic fabrics to reason 
that the ability for one product to imitate another was itself a benefit 
sufficient to satisfy utility.187  In addition to issuing patents for devices 
useful only for deception, the USPTO has issued several patents for 
devices useful only for committing illegal acts (illegal device 
patents).188 
The holding of Juicy Whip is inapplicable to self-replicating 
patented organisms because it dealt with the “deceptive” branch of 
moral utility, whereas self-replicating organisms are capable of injury 
instead of deception.189  However, the rationale behind Fuller and the 
illegal device patents is also inapposite for self-replicating patents 
despite dealing with the injurious branch of moral utility.  Both the 
invention in Fuller and the illegal devices are inanimate objects 
incapable of injuring without human intervention, whereas self-
replicating inventions can injure on their own.190  While moral utility 
has been applied to deceptive, morally objectionable, and illegal 
inventions, the Juicy Whip court only refused to apply it for deceptive 
inventions.191  Self-replicating inventions are not meant to deceive the 
public the way that the reservoir bowl in Juicy Whip was meant to 
deceive customers.192  Instead, as with pollen drift, self-replicating 
                                                          
which may not be considered ‘useful’ but which, nevertheless, are totally without a 
capacity for harm”). 
 182. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 184. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1356–66 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 185. 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 186. Id. at 1356–66. 
 187. Id. at 1367. 
 188. Supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 189. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1364. 
 190. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 57, at 365 (describing patents issued for alcohol 
production during prohibition, drug paraphernalia, radar detectors, and cock-
fighting equipment, all items that only cause harm when used by a person). 
 191. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367–68. 
 192. Id. (describing that the juice dispenser at issue was deceptive because it 
displayed liquid in a reservoir bowl that was not actually the beverage dispensed to 
customers). 
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patented organisms are capable of injury by breaking the law without 
any human interaction.193  Thus, the holding in Juicy Whip does not 
apply to self-replicating inventions. 
Like Juicy Whip, the criminal invention patents and the Fuller 
holding are also distinguishable when applied to self-replicating 
technology.194  The rationale used to justify the granting of patents 
for banned inventions and inventions capable only of being used for 
illegal activity are inapplicable here.195  When self-replicating patents 
cause infringement, the line between the patented invention and its 
use disappears because the invention is acting on its own.196  For 
example, while banned drug paraphernalia requires a user to commit 
an illegal act, such as use or possession, self-replicating technology by 
its very nature and existence can itself cause an illegal act such as 
when the pollen produced by the patented seeds trespasses onto the 
property of a third party.197  Without a distinction between the 
invention and its use, the rationale for illegal device patents is 
inapplicable to self-replicating patented organisms capable of causing 
injury. 
Even if deceptive and illegal inventions were not patentable when 
they are only capable of injurious use, the holding from Fuller would 
still permit them if they had some other use besides injuriousness.198  
But like patents only capable of illegal use, the Fuller court’s rationale 
is also inapposite for self-replicating technology.199  By using the 
example of “Colt’s revolver,” the court in Fuller explained that an 
invention might in fact be injurious to morals by promoting revenge, 
to health by causing wounds or homicide, and to the good order of 
society by increasing “private warfare.”200  However, the court went 
further to state, “[o]n the other hand, the revolver, by furnishing a 
ready means of self-defense, may sometimes have promoted morals 
                                                          
 193. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text (describing the uncontrollable 
nature of pollen drift). 
 194. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (holding that a product 
can be patented if it has legal uses); Schwartz, supra note 57, at 365 (describing 
patented inventions that have criminal uses). 
 195. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (describing the principle that a 
patent does not grant a right to use a device, but only to prevent others from using it). 
 196. The seeds themselves are creating a second generation, so in effect the seeds 
are infringing the patent, and not the farmer who owns the land in which they grow. 
 197. Supra note 193; see also Pollen—Nature’s Tiny Clues, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., 
http://askabiologist.asu.edu/podcasts/pollen-natures-tiny-clues (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013) (explaining that most pollen can travel 300 meters, but there are cases where 
pollen was found 2000 miles from its source). 
 198. Fuller, 120 F. at 275. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 275–76. 
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and health and good order.”201  Such conflicting results are possible 
in nearly any inanimate invention that may be manipulated by 
human beings.  In nearly all situations, the revolver will require a 
person’s will or even a person’s negligence in order to be used to 
cause wounds or to be a means of self-defense as the court implied.202  
The Fuller holding involved an inanimate object requiring human 
manipulation in order to be injurious; therefore, the holding nearly 
vacates the injurious branch of the moral utility test because 
inanimate objects will almost always have some capacity to be used for 
non-injurious purposes. 
The Fuller test, however, does not address the circumstances of self-
replicating inventions.  Even though GM seeds are capable of 
growing food—a useful purpose—they are also capable of causing 
trespass and nuisance.203  But, unlike with Colt’s revolver, a farmer 
does not decide to plant GM seeds for food, and then decide to use 
pollen created from the GM seeds to contaminate another’s property 
or break the law.204  Instead, the seeds themselves cause injury, with 
no human interaction.205  Thus, Fuller’s test does not fully 
accommodate the distinct circumstances of self-replicating inventions 
and should not be applied. 
The Fuller opinion was a way of reconciling the injurious branch of 
the moral utility test206 with the substantial and specific utility tests.207  
If the Fuller opinion is not applicable to self-replicating patented 
organisms, then a new form of reconciling the injurious branch of 
moral utility and specific and substantial utility is needed when the 
invention itself causes the infringement.  One solution is to continue 
applying the current test of at least one specific and substantial use 
for patentability as well as the injurious branch of the moral utility 
test without Fuller’s narrowing when a self-replicating patented 
organism acts without human interaction such as during pollen drift.  
                                                          
 201. Id. 
 202. While accidental discharge and other inadvertent harmful uses may occur, 
the Fuller court was clearly implying that human use and will controls the object.  See 
id. (implying that the Colt’s revolver can be used for good or evil based on the will of 
the person holding it). 
 203. See infra notes 213–39 and accompanying text (describing potential injuries 
associated with pollen drift). 
 204. See, e.g., Bernhardt, supra note 171, at 6 (describing the various ways that 
seeds from plants growing on one farmer’s land can travel to another farmer’s land 
outside the control of either farmer). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 
1817) (No. 8568) (laying out the injurious branch of the moral utility test). 
 207. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (requiring substantial 
utility and a specific benefit). 
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Doing so would mean the patent would only be unenforceable when 
it fails moral utility but would remain enforceable in all other 
situations, thanks to its specific and substantial utility. This would 
allow inventions such as GM seeds to maintain their patent because 
they are specifically and substantially useful in growing food, for 
example.208  But it would also expressly limit patent rights when a self-
replicating patent becomes injurious without human interaction.209  
Thus, because of the injurious branch of the moral utility test, the 
patent holder would have no patent enforcement rights when (1) the 
patented technology causes the infringement with no human 
interaction and (2) the infringing act fails the (pre-Fuller) moral 
utility test.  Carving out patent rights in such a situation would 
accommodate self-replicating technology under moral utility and 
under specific and substantial utility.  Moreover, these limited patent 
rights would leave intact the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Scruggs and 
McFarling, where the GM seed patent infringement occurred because 
of self-replication but was not injurious.210  In those cases, the 
infringer saved seed from a previously licensed patent-protected crop, 
in order to replant it, instead of being injured by self-replicating seed 
through pollen drift that caused a trespass or nuisance.211  Thus, the 
infringement did occur because of self-replication (first prong), but 
did not fail the injurious branch of the moral utility test in 
infringement (second prong).212  Therefore, the patent holder would 
be able to enforce patent rights when a farmer saves seed after 
licensing the seed from the patent holder. 
In the case of GM seeds, there are several forms of injury that can 
occur by the very nature of the patented seed and the natural 
phenomenon of pollen drift.213  First, the pollen can cause nuisance 
                                                          
 208. See, e.g., WADE A. GIVENS ET AL., ROUNDUP READY CROPS HAVE MAJOR POSITIVE IMPACT 
ON TILLAGE PRACTICES (2009), available at http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement 
/Documents/Benchmark-TillageSummaryRept2.pdf (describing some benefits of 
Monsanto’s patented seed technology). 
 209. See, e.g., Bernhardt, supra note 171, at 6 (describing the potential harm done 
to a neighboring farmer’s crops from the introduction of genetic material carried in 
airborne pollen originating from a Monsanto derived plant). 
 210. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (illustrating 
that the defendant purchased Monsanto seeds, yet did not sign a license agreement 
preventing his subsequent reuse of the resulting second generation seeds); 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (revealing that the 
defendant saved seeds generated from the first generation of planted Monsanto 
seeds and then planted them the following season, contrary to the license 
agreement). 
 211. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293. 
 212. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333 (noting that the GM seed was purchased not 
contaminated); McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293 (same). 
 213. Flood, supra note 158, at 474 n.7, 475–76 (suggesting “[p]laintiffs may 
utilize . . . legal theories, such as trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability for 
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because it interferes with the “private use and enjoyment” of 
property.214  For example, in Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co.,215 the 
Iowa Supreme Court held that erection of a cement plant constituted 
a private nuisance because the dust, noise and smell of the plant had 
“changed the neighborhood for the worse.”216  Thus, wind-blown 
cement dust landing on another’s property is sufficient to constitute 
a nuisance, legally harming the victim.217  Similarly, wind-blown 
pollen landing on another’s property also creates a legally actionable 
nuisance claim.218 
Second, the pollen can cause a physical trespass because it 
interferes with the possessory rights of property by entering another’s 
land.219  Trespass can occur even when a person does not enter 
another’s land.220  It is sufficient that one causes a third person or 
thing to do so.221  Additionally, the trespass need not be intentional; 
the trespasser need only be aware that there is a high probability that 
his or her activity will result in trespass.222  Thus, there is liability for 
trespass where the trespass was negligent or the result of abnormally 
dangerous activity.223  Finally, the pollen that drifts can destroy the 
landowner’s possessions by contaminating their crops and soil.224 
                                                          
abnormally dangerous activities, to recover damages for injury caused by genetic 
drift”). 
 214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (defining “liability for a 
private nuisance if, but only if, [one’s] conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of 
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) 
intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under 
the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally 
dangerous conditions or activities” (emphasis added)). 
 215. 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974). 
 216. Id. at 129. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (“Residue from a product drifting across property lines presents a typical 
nuisance claim.”); Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the 
Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”:  Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,328, 10,329 (2000) (outlining the various harms that can occur to farmers due to 
pollen drift of GM crops). 
 219. See Flood, supra note 158, at 482 (comparing an example from the Second 
Restatement that “one who so piles sand close to his boundary that by force of gravity 
alone it slides down onto his neighbor’s land . . . becomes a trespasser on the other’s 
land” to pollen drift where there is substantial certainty that like gravity moving the 
sand, the wind will blow the pollen onto a nearby property (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965))). 
 220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. b (indicating that trespass may 
include “the presence upon the land of a third person or thing which the actor has 
caused to be or to remain there”). 
 221. Id. § 158 cmt. i (indicating that trespass may include “throwing, propelling, 
or placing” a thing on, above, or below the land). 
 222. 16 DAVID K. DEWOLF, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES:  TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 13.31, at 408–09 (3d ed. 2006). 
 223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (“One who recklessly or negligently, 
or as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity, enters land in the possession of 
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Pollen bears many similarities to other types of particulate 
matter that have a known tendency to drift.  In Bradley v. American 
Smelting & Refining Co.,225 a smelting company did not deny that 
whenever the smelter was in operation, the “whim of the winds” 
could deposit its emissions, including arsenic and cadmium, onto the 
plaintiff’s land.226 
The pollen drift from GM seeds, often considered contamination 
by neighboring farmers, contains similar elements of trespass.  
Additional injuries include the receiving farmer losing the actual 
value of his or her crops, the farmer being unable or unwilling to find 
a market to sell the GM crops, or the receiving farmer being legally 
barred from selling them due to patent infringement.227  Just as with 
pollen drift, in Bradley there was a known high-probability that wind 
would move unwanted particulate matter from the defendant’s land 
to the plaintiff’s land, resulting in trespass.228  Although the seed 
industry often refers to contamination as “adventitious presence,”229 
suggesting contamination occurred by chance, it is not by chance that 
organisms reproduce, it is inherent.230  Moreover, the contamination 
destroys the product the farmer intended to grow and in some cases 
of contamination, despite genetic modification, there is no 
“advantage” to the receiving farmer such as a higher crop yield or 
undisturbed use of a glyphosate herbicide (like Roundup) on the 
crop.231  Furthermore, because conventional farmers save seeds from 
                                                          
another or causes a thing or third person so to enter is subject to liability to the 
possessor if, but only if, his presence or the presence of the thing or the third person 
upon the land causes harm to the land, to the possessor, or to a thing or a third 
person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.”). 
 224. See Julie A. Davies & Lawrence C. Levine, Biotechnology’s Challenge to the Law of 
Torts, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 221, 223–24 (2000) (arguing that trespass is possible for 
pollen drift in the biotechnology context); Redick & Bernstein, supra note 218. 
 225. 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985). 
 226. Id. at 785. 
 227. Stephanie E. Cox, Note, Genetically Modified Organisms:  Who Should Pay the 
Price for Pollen Drift Contamination?, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 401, 405, 407 (2008). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Glossary, supra note 2 (defining adventitious presence as “unintended, 
trace levels of traits developed through modern plant biotechnology in seed, grain, 
or feed and food products”). 
 230. See MANIFESTO, supra note 117, at 10 (indicating that the nature of seed is to 
reproduce itself and multiply).  This is particularly true in regard to GM plants 
evidenced by studies that suggest that certain GM crops are more likely to cross-
pollinate than non-GM crops.  Cox, supra note 227, at 405. 
 231. See, e.g., Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 9 (Can.) 
(finding no benefit to using the GM seeds because the farmer did not use them in 
conjunction with the corresponding herbicide). 
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their crop for future replanting,232 crop contamination in one 
growing season contaminates the genetic makeup of that crop’s 
offspring, the seeds that the farmer would be using for future 
growing seasons.233  Worse yet, the genetic contamination can stay in 
the seed’s genome for fifteen years.234 
Finally, a farm certified as organic or GM-free may lose its 
certification and its market once contaminated by GM pollen.235  For 
example, the European Union requires labeling of GM food 
products; if a farmer’s crops are not labeled, they cannot sell to that 
market, but the farm also cannot label their crops without paying the 
license fee to the patent holder, despite being contaminated through 
no fault of the farmer.236 
Even if the patent holder were to offer to remove contaminated 
crops, the farmer would have lost his sellable crop for the year and 
the cost of seeds.237  The plethora of individual harms are the result 
of the self-replicating nature of the invention—the very invention 
that continues to be granted protection despite causing injury.238 
                                                          
 232. Farmers Protest Loss of Saving Seed, DELTA FARM PRESS (Apr. 6, 2001), 
http://deltafarmpress.com/farmers-protest-loss-saving-seed (“As long as farmers 
have tilled soil, they have saved seed for their own use . . . .”). 
 233. Rhea Gala, GM Contamination Accelerating:  No Co-Existence Possible, INST. OF SCI. 
IN SOC’Y (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.i-sis.org.uk/GMCANCEP.php (indicating that 
the contamination of a seed stays within its genome, thereby affecting the seed’s 
offspring). 
 234. GEOFF SQUIRE ET AL., SCOTTISH CROP RESEARCH INST., THE POTENTIAL FOR 
OILSEED RAPE FERAL (VOLUNTEER) WEEDS TO CAUSE IMPURITIES IN LATER OILSEED RAPE 
CROPS 10 (2003), available at http://www.scri.ac.uk/scri/file/EPI/Agroecology/ 
Volunteer_impurities_in_oilseed_rape_rg0114.pdf (finding that that GM canola can 
contaminate non-GM varieties for fifteen years). 
 235. First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 36; Flood, supra note 158, at 476 
(discussing the loss of Mathew Kraft’s organic corn certification due to pollen drift 
from GM corn); Flood, supra note 158, at 490 (“Currently no private or 
governmental certification program for organic food allows use of GMO seeds.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Redick & Bernstein, supra note 218, at 
10,329 (explaining that when non-GM farmers ship GM contaminated products to 
GM-free countries, their crops are rejected and labeled “unmarketable by the 
comingling of a single variety of GMO that is not approved for import to the EU or 
other major trading partners”). 
 236. See The World According to Monsanto, supra note 126 (discussing with Brazilian 
ministers how the Brazilian market had mysteriously become contaminated with GM 
soy causing exports to Europe to be rejected and how that played a role in Brazil 
legalizing GM seeds). 
 237. See supra note 170 (explaining how Schmeiser sued for the cost of later 
contamination removal and Monsanto settled for the cost of removal); see also Aoki, 
supra note 127, at 297 (discussing how an individual whose crops were contaminated 
with the pollen from GM seeds was required to dig up his land and lost all his seeds, 
with no offer to replace the seeds or compensate the farmer). 
 238. Supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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B. Courts Should Not Enforce Patent Rights when Infringment Arises from 
Unlawful Trespass or Nuisance Caused by the Self-Replicating Patented 
Organism 
Applying ex turpi causa oritur non actio, courts have held that the test 
for whether a demand connected with an illegal action is enforceable 
is whether the plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to 
establish his case.239  In many cases, this means that the cause of 
action and the illegal action were based on the same facts.240  
Similarly, in a patent infringement suit for pollen drift, the applicable 
facts to infringement are the same as those that show nuisance or 
trespass on the part of the patent holder.  For example, in Sirkin v. 
Fourteenth St. Store,241 a hosiery distributer sued a buyer over the price 
of hosiery delivered.242  The buyer brought a defense that the seller 
had obtained the contract by bribing the buyer’s purchasing agent in 
violation of a New York statute making bribery a misdemeanor.243  
The appellate court held the contract unenforceable because it 
conflicted with “the public policy of the state, [and] it is the duty of 
the court to be guided thereby in administering the law.”244  The 
same is true in pollen drift:  nuisance and trespass evidence the 
public policy of the state, and as such, the court should not uphold a 
patent causing a trespass or nuisance. 
The doctrine of ex turpi causa seeks to protect the greater 
population from the harms that can result from encouraging illegal 
acts.  In Veazey v. Allen,245 the New York Court of Appeals further 
clarified the purpose of the ex turpi causa doctrine by noting that it is 
intended for the protection of society in general and not for the 
protection of litigants.246  Therefore, in an action between the parties 
to a fraudulent scheme, it is no defense that the victim is satisfied 
with the bargain and is initially benefitted by the plaintiff’s fraud.247  
Courts have further justified the doctrine as a deterrence of illegal 
                                                          
 239. See, e.g., Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 149 (1883) (“If . . . the cause of action 
appear[s] to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, 
then the court says he has no right to be assisted.”).  But see Ingram v. Mitchell, 30 
Ga. 547, 550 (1860) (holding that “whenever the plaintiff can make out his case 
without invoking the illegal contract to his aid, he is entitled to recover”). 
 240. Ewell, 108 U.S. at 149 (indicating courts will not assist a plaintiff whose cause 
of action arises from illegal acts). 
 241. 108 N.Y.S. 830 (App. Div. 1908). 
 242. Id. at 831. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 833–34. 
 245. 66 N.E. 103 (N.Y. 1903). 
 246. Id. at 107–08. 
 247. Id. at 105–07. 
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conduct248 and the preservation of respect for the rule of law.249  This 
perspective could be particularly valuable for pollen drift, which not 
only harms the victim, but the public food supply as well.250  In In re 
Starlink Corn Products Liability Litigation,251 GM corn that had been 
approved only for animal consumption was unknowingly released 
into the human food supply via pollen drift.252  Only after products 
such as corn tortillas were sent to restaurants and super markets did 
testing reveal their GM contamination; massive product recalls 
followed.253 
While patenting seed does not break the law as an illegal contract 
does, the effects of self-replication, such as pollen drift, can cause 
violations of the laws prohibiting trespass, nuisance, and the strict 
liability negligence for an abnormally dangerous activity.254  Thus, to 
enforce patent rights that treat pollen drift as an infringement and 
overlook the violations caused by the drift would “sully[] the 
machinery of justice.”255  The doctrine should be extended to patent 
infringement suits because the rationales that apply it to other fields 
of law are applicable and necessary in patent law.  Once the specific 
illegal or tortious circumstance occurs, the right to sue for patent 
infringement is in conflict with the right to be free of trespass, 
nuisance, or negligence.256  Just as enforcing the right to contract for 
                                                          
 248. See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669–70 (1899) (asserting that when 
parties understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they place 
themselves outside the protection of the law that consists of aiding them to enforce 
such contracts, then the less inclined they will be to enter into such contracts); see 
also Sirken, 108 N.Y.S. at 834 (“I think nothing will be more effective in stopping the 
growth and spread of this corrupting and now criminal custom [of commercial 
bribery] than a decision that the courts will refuse their aid to a guilty vendor or 
vendee . . . .”). 
 249. Prentice, supra note 68, at 106–22 (setting forth courts’ justifications for the 
doctrine). 
 250. Infra Part II.C. 
 251. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 252. Id. at 834–35, 841. 
 253. See Melinda Fulmer, Taco Bell Recalls Shells that Used Bioengineered Corn, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/23/news/mn-25314 
(estimating the recall of Taco Bell taco shells cost Kraft food roughly $50 million). 
 254. See Flood, supra note 158, at 474–76 (suggesting “trespass, nuisance, 
negligence, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities” as claims against 
pollen drift). 
 255. See Prentice, supra note 68, at 60, 119 (noting that a court’s ruling allowing 
criminals to profit from their crime would “sully the court’s reputation”); see also 
Manning v. Noa, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. 1956) (“Our doors are open to both the 
virtuous and the villainous.  We do not, however, lend our aid to the furtherance of 
an unlawful project, nor do we decide, as between two scoundrels, who cheated 
whom the more.”). 
 256. Compare In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (concluding 
that “[t]he patent right is [really] a right to exclude”), with Church of Christ in 
Hollywood v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 817 (Ct. App. 2002) 
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an illegal act would violate contracting principles, allowing patent 
enforcement for circumstances such as pollen drift undermines the 
ex turpi causa doctrine.  Protecting the interest of society requires 
both preserving respect for the law and deterring tortious conduct by 
refusing to lend the law’s aid to tortfeasors.257  Additionally, 
application of the ex turpi causa doctrine would encourage patent 
holders to require precautionary measures preventing pollen drift 
and deter patent holders from seeking to gain from the victims of 
pollen drift. 
The effect of a contractual illegality under the ex turpi causa 
doctrine is generally that the courts refuse to aid either party.258  
While some courts have stated that illegal contracts are void from 
their inception, the effect may more accurately be described as 
“simply leav[ing] the parties . . . where the court finds them.”259  
Alternatively, a court may mitigate the damage by holding that only 
part of the agreement is enforceable.260  Such divisibility entails 
separating a contract into pairs of corresponding consideration and 
performance, and then enforcing only the part of the agreement that 
does not materially advance the improper purpose.261  Similarly, 
applying ex turpi causa to patent infringement cases would not 
completely invalidate the patent; it would only make the patent rights 
unenforceable when illegal circumstances were present.  Just as the 
court may enforce only parts of a contract that do not support an 
illegality,262 the court should enforce a patent holder’s right to 
exclude only when the patent is not causing the violation of laws that 
prohibit nuisance or trespass.  Specifically, causing such a violation is 
not equal to the mere capability of being used by a human to commit 
                                                          
(“[L]andowners . . . have a right to exclude [others] from trespassing on private 
property . . . .” (quoting Allred v. Harris, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 533 (Ct. App. 1993))). 
 257. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (explaining that the court will 
deny rights to those whose actions appear to arise ex turpi causa). 
 258. See Prentice, supra note 68, at 61 & n.46 (noting that this often means that 
one party profits unjustly at the expense of the other). 
 259. Id. 
 260. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 3–4 (3d ed. 2004). 
 261. Id. § 5.8, at 88.  For example, in Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 
1971), a covenant for an oral surgeon not to practice “dentistry and/or oral surgery” 
was held void as to dentistry but enforceable as to oral surgery.  Id. at 754–56.  
Attempting to exclude both professions violated the law that “a man [cannot] be 
excluded from a profession for which he has been trained when he does not 
compete with his former employer by practicing it.”  Id. 
 262. Compare Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 969–70 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(holding a contract void and unenforceable because illegal portions were not 
severable), with Coolidge Co. v. Mokrynski, 472 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D.N.Y 1979) 
(enforcing a covenant to the extent that it was reasonable by severing “the 
impermissible from the valid”). 
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a crime or an illegal act, as with “Colt’s revolver,”263 but rather, as with 
pollen drift, involves no human interaction. 
While only natural or legal persons are capable of violating the law, 
patented organisms may cause persons to violate the law when they 
self-replicate.  An illegal act caused by pollen drift should be directly 
attributed to the holder of the patent and not the licensee.264  Sole 
liability should lie with the patent holder because pollen drift victims 
often cannot be certain of the pollen’s origin, so there may be no 
other farmer to sue.265  Moreover, Monsanto has previously settled 
with farmers over the cost of removal after contamination and has 
offered to remove contamination in certain circumstances, essentially 
linking their patent ownership to the pollen drift.266 
The link between the patent holder and the self-replicated seed has 
also been established by the Federal Circuit via the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion.267  Although saving self-replicated seed after having 
licensed GM seed is distinct from having one’s crops be 
contaminated by GM seed, each is equally considered to be patent 
infringement under current law.  In both seed saving and pollen 
drift, the patented item self-replicates.268  In McFarling and Scruggs, 
both defendants were sued for infringement because they saved the 
seeds that were reproduced from the patented seed.269  However, 
Scruggs and McFarling purchased seed from Monsanto under the 
actual or implied condition that they not save reproduced seed, then 
saved and replanted the reproduced seed and were found to be 
infringing the patent.270  They each argued that the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion applied and that the patent did not extend to the 
reproduced seed.271  The Federal Circuit twice disagreed and stated 
in Scruggs, that “[w]ithout the actual sale of the second generation 
                                                          
 263. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903). 
 264. Most genetic seeds are licensed, not sold.  See MTSA, supra note 7 (licensing 
seeds only); see also Van Pelt, supra note 107, at 579 (arguing that “trespass is not a 
defense against the infringement” but an “after-the-fact solution”). 
 265. Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose:  Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in 
Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 555 (2004) (pointing out that if multiple transgenic 
crops are grown by different farmers around the alleged infringer’s field, it may be 
difficult to prove the source of the nuisance). 
 266. Supra note 170. 
 267. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(permitting patent holder rights, as established in a license, to extend to second 
generation seed), No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 
459 F.3d 1328, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (same). 
 268. See supra Part I.D. 
 269. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333 (charging that the defendant saved seeds, contrary 
to a license agreement); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293–94 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (same). 
 270. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293–94. 
 271. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298. 
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seed . . . there can be no patent exhaustion.  The fact that a patented 
technology can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to 
use replicated copies of the technology.”272  This is very different from 
Farmer A purchasing patented seed, then that seed contaminating 
Farmer B’s crops through pollen drift, which is a stage of self-
replication.  Although pollen drift and seed saving are distinct, these 
seed saving cases guide the issue of liability in pollen drift cases 
because they both involve the prohibited use of self-replicated seed.  
The Federal Circuit’s holdings in McFarling, Scruggs, and Bowman that 
patent exhaustion does not apply to using self-replicated seed 
indicates that the patent holder retains complete rights to the self-
replicated seed that drift onto an unsuspecting farmer’s land. 273 
The Federal Circuit extended patent rights, and thus, the 
connection between patent holder and self-replicated seed, in 
Bowman,274 even where the defendant had not saved licensed seed, 
but purchased reproduced seed from a grain elevator that was under 
no license.275  Those circumstances are also distinct from having one’s 
crop contaminated by pollen drift. 
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s holding in any and all of the 
three cases that the patent holder has perpetual control over seeds 
that have self-replicated276 strengthens the idea that the patent 
holder, and not the licensee, should be held liable to any illegal acts 
caused by the self-replicating nature of the patented seed.  Because 
the patent holder has the benefit of retaining the rights to the second 
generation seed, it follows that the patent holder should then be held 
liable for the second generation seed. 
C. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Pollen Drift to the “Infringer” Should Be 
Dealt with Outside of Patent Law 
Proponents of utility patents for self-replicating technology may 
argue that even if the infringement is unintentional, the infringer 
could in some cases benefit from it.277  In cases where pollen drift has 
                                                          
 272. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336. 
 273. The Supreme Court heard arguments in Bowman as this Comment went to 
print.  As such, the Court’s decision may affect this point.   
 274. 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013). 
 275. Id. at 1347–48. 
 276. See id. (permitting patent holder rights to extend to second generation seed); 
Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335–36 (same); McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298–99 (same). 
 277. This might apply to someone who may realize that GM seeds are on their 
land and then use the corresponding herbicide to create a higher yield.  See, e.g., 
Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, para. 2 (Can.) (explaining the 
trial court’s reasoning that the farmer knew of the contamination and intentionally 
saved seed), aff’d, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).  But it would not apply, for example, to 
an organic farmer who is harmed by the contamination.  See First Amended 
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caused injury through self-replication of the patented organism and 
the receiving farmer does not remove the product (and infringement 
is not found under this test), the court may need to decide whether 
the farmer should be allowed to benefit from the trespass.278  Not 
only is it appropriate to prohibit patent infringement cases in these 
instances, it is appropriate to place the burden of preventing harm 
on the patent holder.279 
The two doctrines that support burden-shifting to the licensees are 
the wandering bull doctrine and acquisition by find.  The wandering 
bull doctrine holds that if a bull wanders onto the property of 
another and mates, the offspring belong to the owner of the cow, not 
the owner of the wandering bull.280  The doctrine of acquisition by 
find in sub-surface property holds that if an item is found embedded 
in the soil, then it goes to the landowner even if that owner did not 
know it existed.281  These doctrines support the proposition that the 
burden lies with the owner of movable property to protect what is 
rightfully his or hers, or risk losing it to those who find it first. In the 
context of pollen drift, the burden lies with the patent holder to 
protect its product. 
There are additional solutions to eliminate the unintended 
infringement caused by pollen drift that the patentees should be 
responsible for implementing.  For example, the patent holder could 
limit drift by requiring that growers of its product have a buffer zone 
around crops, or in some cases such as alfalfa, the product can be 
harvested before pollen is released—greatly decreasing the likelihood 
                                                          
Complaint, supra note 11, at 1 (alleging inevitable harm to organic growers).  
However, even if the farmer did benefit from the unintentional infringement, 
trespass and nuisance in themselves can be harm that negates the application of 
strict liability.  See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953) 
(“[A]ny substantial nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use 
and enjoyment of land by any type of liability forming conduct is a private 
nuisance . . . .”). 
 278. Supra note 277. 
 279. See Flood, supra note 158, at 486 (analogizing pollen drift cases to cases 
involving wandering bulls, where courts place the burden of restraining the bulls on 
the owner of the animal). 
 280. See Fuchser v. Jacobsen, 290 N.W.2d 449 (Neb. 1980) (discussing the 
wandering bull doctrine).  But see Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2001 FCT 256, 
para. 93 (Can.) (rejecting and distinguishing the wandering bull argument by saying 
Monsanto does not own the plant as a rancher owns a bull, but instead owns the 
gene and has exclusive use), aff’d, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). 
 281. See Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., (1886) 33 Ch.D. 562 (Eng.) (setting precedent for 
finder’s law in property law by holding a landowner is in lawful possession of 
everything in and under the land, referring to a boat found under the surface). 
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of contamination.282  Additionally, counties could zone agricultural 
areas by GM use, conventional use, and organic use.  Alternatively, 
such measures could be mandated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. 
There are public policy reasons why there should be no patent 
rights when a self-replicating patented organism causes injury.  By 
placing the burden to prevent contamination on the receiving (non-
GM) farmer, that farmer may be incentivized to use GM seeds to 
avoid being sued for patent infringement or to avoid losing a market 
that requires GM labeling if contaminated. Moreover, if greater 
numbers of farmers produce GM foods, the decrease in biodiversity 
may put food security at risk because there are fewer breeds of food 
to withstand various conditions.283  Additionally, extending patents to 
self-replicated seed can unintentionally facilitate the control of the 
majority of food by only a few who are able to direct price and supply.  
Already, seed and crop statistics reveal the irreversible disappearance 
of seed and crop diversity; in fact, “[o]f 80,000 edible plants used for 
food, only about 150 are being cultivated, and just eight are traded 
globally.284  Not surprisingly, this “erosion of diversity has been 
propelled by the drive for homogenisation in industrial 
agriculture.”285 As the protection for GM products continues, so do 
the harmful effects on the general population, with consequences 
that will effect civilization for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
The self-replicating nature of some types of patented organisms, 
such as seeds, demands that the patent system reexamine the full 
exclusion rights of patents.  The current Patent Act does not 
accommodate patent subjects that can act without humans in 
creating harm, and thus, lose their usefulness with absolutely no 
human intervention.  Such a situation should not warrant exclusion 
rights because it goes beyond the usefulness requirement in utility 
patents.  Additionally, enforcing infringement rights where the same 
act of infringement is also harming the “infringer” undermines the 
                                                          
 282. See Can Roundup Ready Alfalfa Coexist with Organic and Conventional Alfalfa, 
MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/roundup-ready-alfalfa-organic-
coexist.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining this approach for alfalfa). 
 283. See MANIFESTO, supra note 117, at 7 (documenting the correlation between 
“[t]oday’s industrial productivity strategies” and the disappearance of local seeds and 
the disappearance of small farmers, local food cultures, and the local knowledge 
about plant varieties in local ecological and cultural habitats). 
 284. Id. at 6. 
 285. Id. at 9–10. 
LYND.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013  1:15 PM 
700 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:663 
rule of law by violating ex turpi causa non oritur actio.  Voiding 
exclusion rights when the self-replicating patented organism is 
injurious would not completely void the patent for GM seeds, but it 
would prevent patent infringement suits when the patented organism 
fails the moral utility test. 
As biotechnology expands, biodiversity narrows, and super-weeds 
grow,286 infringement suits will only increase in importance. 
Unfortunately, narrowing patent rights in harmful situations will not 
prevent pollen drift, but it will protect innocent farmers and possibly 
the food supply. 
                                                          
 286. See Justina Reichel, First ‘Superweed’ Appears in Western Canada, EPOCH TIMES 
(Jan. 22, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/first-
superweed-appears-in-western-canada-178446.html (explaining the rise of weed 
resistance to herbicides and GM traits); see also Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Corn May Be 
Failing To Kill Bugs in 4 States, EPA Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 6. 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-06/monsanto-corn-may-be-failing-to-
kill-bugs-in-4-states-epa-says.html (discussing rootworm resistance to Bt cotton in four 
U.S. states and in India). 
